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Abstract 
What determines the outcome of judicial decisions? A traditional answer to this 
question is that it involves a complex application of rules derived from the reasons for 
judgment of analogous common law decisions and applicable statutes under the 
doctrine of stare decisis. This answer is problematic. One significant problem of this 
answer is its inability to explain the outcome of cases where the judgment does not 
appear to be based on these traditionally recognized sources. An alternative answer, 
provided by a particular field of legal scholarship, Legal Realism, posits that “other” 
factors make a significant impact on the outcome of a given case. A recent legal realist 
theory offered by R. Graham utilizes principles of Legal Realism, Economics, and 
Interpretive Theories to form a framework for describing the actual constraining forces 
acting on judges when they are tasked with interpreting statutes. Central to this theory 
is the influence of the deciding judge’s self-interest on the outcome of his or her 
interpretive decisions. The primary purpose of the current paper is to extend Graham’s 
multi-disciplinary theory from its current application to statutory interpretation to now 
also include common law interpretation. Secondarily, this paper will provide a multiple-
case example of how this interpretive theory would apply to a series of judgments 
related to limits placed on cross-examination that are particularly troublesome for the 
seemingly inconsistent and surprising decisions.  
Key Words 
Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, Law and Economics. 
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Foreword 
 
Understanding how legal decisions are reached, including the extrajudicial forces that 
are at play, and the nature of, and constraints on, expert testimony are all factors 
relevant to my future career as an expert witness concerning the determination of 
future care costs in personal injury litigation. As such I have undertaken a review of 
current Interpretive Theory, through the lens of a theory advanced by R Graham in the 
context of statutory law, and applied it to common law. This analysis provides insights 
into how the Canadian judicial system works and helps inform my preparation as an 
expert witness, particularly as it relates to the need for precision in the written or 
spoken word. It also informs that even with precision the written or spoken word may 
be subject to interpretation in different ways. Clearly the search for truth and justice 
demand careful scrutiny of words, intent and interpretation for all stages in the judicial 
process, from witness through to the trier of fact in all jurisdictions at all levels of the 
judicial process.  
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Chapter 1  
1.1 General Introduction  
The constraining forces acting on a judge’s common law decision are supposed to be 
prior judicial decisions and applicable legislation but occasionally there are decisions 
that stand out for being reached in a manner that does not appear to be predicated on 
these constraining forces. Viewed exclusively through the lens of precedent and stare 
decisis, these decisions do not make sense.  Even a cursory review of the relevant 
authoritative law reveals that the decision reached was not a logical extension or 
application of the law cited in the published decision.1 Fortunately, there exists a type of 
legal philosophy that is well-suited to explain these surprising decisions; Legal Realism.  
Legal Realism has many denominations, but all of these denominations include one 
main theme. In The Canadian Legal System, Gall summarized this common theme of 
Legal Realism:  
In analyzing the judicial process, it is not sufficient merely to conclude that a 
judge is deciding the cases of individual litigants having regard only to the 
particular facts adduced in evidence, as such facts are applied to cold, hard, 
legal rules, be they statutory in nature or in the nature of precedent cases at 
common law. There are in short, other components to judicial decision-making.2 
In other words, there are factors at play that inform a judge or justice’s decision on a 
particular legal issue other than the confined scope of factors that influence legal 
decisions under the traditional view. Generally, proponents of Legal Realism view 
themselves as appreciative of the human element in judicial decision-making and do not 
                                                          
1
 If any case-law is cited at all. 
2
 G Gall, The Canadian Legal System (5th edn Carswell Toronto 1995) at 220.    
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limit their understanding of judicial decision-making to how it ought to operate; instead 
they view the judicial decision-making as how it in fact operates.3 Yet, despite Legal 
Realism’s noble efforts to accurately portray determinants of judicial decisions it has 
been slow to gain widespread acceptance.4  
A recent advancement in describing what actually informs judicial decisions was made 
by Professor Graham. His theory provides a lens, founded upon principles of micro-
economics, critical legal studies and various theories of statutory interpretation, through 
which one can examine published decisions of cases involving statutory interpretation 
and gain a fuller understanding of the factors that affected the outcome. Graham’s 
theory posits that judicial self-interest constrains interpretive choices available when 
judges examine legislation.5 Graham claims that, when examined through this lens, 
judicial decisions are a result of the judge evaluating the various possible interpretations 
of a given legal text and choosing the one that most closely coincides with the judge’s 
personal preferences. Factors such as time and reputation are prominent costs and 
benefits considered in this model when determining the chosen interpretive outcome of 
the judge on a particular section of legislation. The stated purpose of this theory is to 
apply Price Theory to Statutory Interpretation to more accurately describe the factors 
deciding the outcome of judicial decisions.  
                                                          
3
 Ibid at 13.  
4
 Graham ‘What Judges Want: Judicial Self-interest and Statutory Interpretation’ (2009) 30 Stat L R at 46.   
5
 Ibid at 39. 
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1.2 Purpose and Map 
While Graham’s theory has thus far been constrained to an examination of the judicial 
interpretation of legislation, I propose that it could be extended to an examination of 
the judicial interpretation and application of Canadian case law. Thus, the purpose of 
this paper is to extend Graham’s description of the constraints on judicial interpretation 
of legislation to also include factors constraining common law interpretation. To this 
end, I will first review components of Graham’s theory and describe what their common 
law interpretation counterpart might look like. Secondly, in the form of a multiple-case 
study, I will apply Graham’s theory in a manner that is designed to shed light on other 
potential factors influencing some confusing decisions made in a series of cases 
resolving issues plaguing the limitations placed on the rights of cross-examination.  
Chapter 2.  
2.1 The Traditional View of the Common Law 
In the traditional view, the Canadian legal system has two main sources of law; statutory 
enactments and cases adjudicated by courts.6 Statutory enactments are the most 
important legal sources of law7 and can be formed by the Parliament of Canada and 
each provincial legislature.8 Decisions made by courts adjudicating particular issues are 
the second major source of law. In these decisions, the courts set out, inter alia, the 
reasons for decision, otherwise known as the ratio decidendi. The ratio decidendi serves 
                                                          
6
 Customs, morality, authoritative sources are other potential sources of law: Gall, note 2 p 7.   
7
 The Constitution is more important than “ordinary” statutes but does still count as a special form of 
legislation (one that isn’t passed by Parliament or a provincial legislature, but through the collective 
efforts of all relevant legislative bodies). 
8
 Subordinate legislation can be enacted by a person, body or tribunal subordinate to a sovereign body; 
Ibid at 39.  
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as a guiding principle for future cases involving similar fact scenarios. The Courts follow 
these principles in future cases under the doctrine of stare decisis. Stare decisis literally 
translates as “to stand by decided matters,” and is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase 
“stare decisis et non quieta movere” which translates as “to stand by decisions and not 
to disturb settled matters.”9 Though the doctrine of stare decisis has a large body of 
research devoted to establishing its influence on the law, the traditional description of 
stare decisis can be briefly described as a rule that the decision of a higher court acts as 
binding authority on a lower court within that same jurisdiction.10 This doctrine is 
intended to promote fair and just treatment11 and is desirable for promoting stability, 
certainty and order in the law. To wit, Benjamin Cardozo noted:  
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants 
and the opposite way between another. “If a group of cases involves the same 
point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to 
decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me 
yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgement today if I 
am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and 
wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my 
rights.” Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the 
exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of 
justice in the courts.12 
 
2.2 Legal Realism 
There are critics of this romantic, traditional view of stare decisis and precedent. For 
these critics the question becomes: If not traditionally recognized sources of law, what 
then determines the outcome of judicial decisions? To answer this question, prominent 
                                                          
9
 Ibid at 38.  
10
 HK Lucke ‘Ratio Decidendi: Adjudicative Rationale and Source of Law’ 1 Bond L R 37 (1989).  
11
 W K Frankena Ethics 2nd edn (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1973) at 49. 
12
 B Cardozo ‘The Nature of the Judicial Process’ (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1921) at 
9-50.  
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legal scholars13 have suggested other factors that decide the outcome. Other factors, 
that are not accounted for in the traditional view of sources of law, have empirical and 
logical evidence supporting their contribution to the decision making process of 
judges.14 Such factors include: dislike of a lawyer; gratitude to the appointing 
authorities; desire of advancement; irritation with or even a desire to undermine a 
colleague; willingness to trade votes; desire to be on good terms; not wanting to 
disagree with people one likes; fear for personal safety; fear of ridicule; reluctance to 
offend; influencing the direction of policy; being the object of deference by lawyers and 
litigants; being adored by legal academics; gaining high judicial office; seeing the morally 
worthier party prevail in a particular case; leisure time; desire for prestige; promoting 
the public interest; avoiding reversal; enhancing reputation; reaching the outcome they 
prefer; increasing their leisure time; anticipating what other people or groups will think 
of them based on their decisions; seeing that their will is obeyed; being promoted.15 
While proving Legal Realism is outside the scope of this paper and is not necessary 
because it is here, it is predictive and persuasive. Instead, specific issues that are 
problematic with respect to strict adherence to stare decisis in the following case study 
will be elaborated.  
                                                          
13
 See: F Schauer ‘Lecture: Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behaviour’ 
68 U Cin L Rev 615; K Llewellyn The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Boston, MA: Little, Brown  
& Co, 1960). 
14
 M Gerhardt ‘The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent’ 7 U Pa J Const L 903, 911 (2005).  
15
 R Posner ‘What do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)’ (1993) 3 
Supreme C Econ Rev 1; F Schauer ‘Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial 
Behaviour’ (2000) 68 U Cin L Rev 615, 69; B Friedman ‘The Politics of Judicial Review’ (2005) 84 Tex L Rev 
257, 258. 
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Another critique of the efficacy of stare decisis and precedent is that it largely depends 
on finding a ratio decidendi within the decision. This is uniquely a common law problem. 
The ratio decidendi, is the “binding essence of a judicial decision”,16 or as defined in the 
1957 House of Lords decision: “the principle of law propounded by the judge as the 
basis of his decision.”17 In critique of the above mentioned classical definitions of ratio 
decidendi, HK Lucke noted:  
…such definitions seem to imply that the determination of the ratio decidendi is 
not an unduly difficult task: first one searches the precedent for a convenient 
statement of  rule, then one ensures by an appropriate test that this rule was 
actually the basis of the decision rather than mere obiter dictum, and then one 
applies the rule to the facts of later cases, rather as one would apply a statutory 
provision.18  
However, critics question whether a ratio decidendi can be readily identified. Specific 
questions raised, regarding the easy identification and the efficacy of a ratio decidendi, 
include whether or not a ratio can be derived from five separate judges’ opinions in a 
case and whether a ratio decidendi is ever a meaningful and useful concept?  
Further, legal realists argue that the number of tools available can be used strategically 
by lawyers, judges and justices to, persuade a given audience in a manner that suits the 
user’s best interests. This is in opposition of some rigid construction of law that is unable 
to be manipulated; a construction of law propagated in the traditional view. Some 
examples of legal argument tools that lawyers and judges can use to “work around” 
stare decisis include: (1) arguing the precedent case does not stand for the legal 
proposition for which it has been cited; (2) arguing that the proposition was in obiter 
                                                          
16
 Supra, note 10. 
17
 JL Montrose ‘Ratio and the House of Lords’ (1957) 20 MLR 124.  
18
 Supra, note 10.   
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dicta; (3) arguing that the case has been effectively overruled by a decision of a higher 
court or by way of statute; (4) arguing that the cases are considerably factually different 
and thus distinguishable, either in a restrictive or non-restrictive manner; (5) arguing 
that public policy has changed and the old decision is distinguishable based on the 
change of circumstance; and  (6) arguing that there is another precedent of equal 
weighting that stands for the opposite proposition.19 It appears there is room for 
lawyers, judges and justices to work with when determining precedent decisions and 
their respective principles. This flexibility destabilizes the law, and forces the judge to 
make more questionable decisions. That is, lawyers are able to argue and judges and 
justices are able to rationalize old decisions on the basis that the rationes decidendi 
cited in those decisions are mistaken interpretations, as a tool used in building their 
respective arguments or decisions.  
2.3 Analytical Framework 
 
To extend Graham’s theory into the common law, I will review some key 
assumptions in his theory. Then, I will describe some key differences between 
statutory interpretation and common law interpretation that could alter the 
decision-making process the judge goes through when interpreting common law.  
Graham’s theory, which analyzes a judge’s interpretive decision as the outcome of 
weighing the competing costs and benefits, is an extension of a micro-economic 
approach of analysing decision making in general.  A central assumption to this theory is 
                                                          
19
 Supra, note 2 at 363-365.  
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that judges have preferences. A judge’s set of preferences can be wide ranging and vary 
considerably among cases and amongst judges, some examples include reputation and 
political influence. Graham noted: 
According to the Realist vision, judges interpret texts in ways that give effect to 
their own preferences. According to micro-economics, ‘people choose to 
perform those actions which they think will promote their own interests’. When 
they manipulate the law in the direction of their own policy preferences, judges 
fulfill the basic predictions of economics, acting as self-interested utility 
maximizers. All things being equal, an interpretation which promotes the 
judge’s personal policy preferences will generate (for the judge) more utility 
than a contrary interpretation. As a utility maximizer the judge is very likely to 
select the interpretation that coincides with his or her preferences.20  
 
Further, it is assumed that these preferences can be compared. D Kennedy described 
the assumptions made with respect to preferences in this model: 
First the preferences of any given agent are typically not sensitive to the 
preferences of other agents. Second, for any given individual, all options are 
taken to be preferentially comparable, i.e., the preference ordering is 
connected. Third, individual preferences are often assumed to be monetizable, 
that is, the individual can put a dollar value on how much he or she prefers one 
alternative to another. Fourth, in more formal treatments, it is customary to 
operationalize the concept of individual preference by supposing that for a 
person to prefer x to y is consistently to choose x over y in a variety of settings 
in which both options are available.21  
The preference set of a particular judge will influence how he or she calculates the cost 
or benefit of a given common-law interpretive decision. While the influence of a judge’s 
preferences on an interpretive decision may seem self-centered and unrealistic at first 
glance, it becomes more reasonable if you consider that a judge may have a preference 
                                                          
20
 Supra, note 4 at 51. 
21
 D Kennedy ‘Law and Economics from a Philosophical Perspective’ in P Newman The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and The Law (1998) at 460.  
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for being seen as a quality judge. A quality judge defined broadly as the one whose 
decisions are based on logical, well-founded principles that are clearly described.  
When extending this framework into common law interpretation it must, again, be 
assumed that judges are ordinary people responding rationally to incentives,22 that the 
preferences of the judges will still vary and that the outcomes of the interpretive 
decision will be influenced by the particular set of preferences of the judge. However, 
an adjustment of these preferences should be made to reflect the differences between 
statutory interpretation and common law interpretation. It is possible that a switch 
from statutory to common law interpretation could alter the costs and benefits 
associated with a judge’s preferences. One example is that a common law interpretive 
decision involves interpreting a colleague’s writing as opposed to that of a legislative 
author. This could provide incentive to interpret the text in a way that is in line with 
current political values which would strengthen the previous court’s decision and aid 
the relationship with the prior judge. Another example is that differences exist in the 
public expectations of judges.  It might be easier for a judge to engage in the ideological 
manipulation of the common law because, simply put, that’s the judge’s job.  In 
statutory interpretation, by contrast, judges are supposed to be passive actors, simply 
carrying out parliament’s will.23  While judges are expected to “make law” when 
engaged in common law reasoning, the factors they consider when “making law” are 
supposed to be confined to prior decisions, logic, and the ‘equities’ of the case.  
                                                          
22
 Posner noted how an analysis could be performed of the exceptional “genius judges”.  
23
 R Graham Statutory Interpretation: Theory and Practice (Emond Montgomery Toronto 2001) at 4. 
Judges as passive actors refers only to Originalist judges.  By contrast, judges who use dynamic 
interpretation are openly activist. 
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Each of the above noted differences between statutory and common law interpretation 
may affect the cost/benefit calculation the judge takes into consideration when making 
a decision. For example, in common law interpretation, a judge will maintain much of 
the reputational payout because they are more responsible for the direction and 
interpretation of the law while at the same time experience less time-cost because 
there are less cost factors because they don’t need as much justification to overturn a 
common law decision. This combination of moderate payout and low time cost in 
common law interpretation would incentivise the judge, relative to a statutory 
interpretation, to decide on an interpretation that accords more closely with their own 
preferences.   
One possible complaint with this view would arise from the question of - why would 
judges make interpretive choices that appear to act against their preferences? A 
possible answer is that it is likely a matter of us, as observers of the decision, not having 
a complete understanding of the influences on that judge. For example, a judge 
acquitting a person who he thinks is deserving of punishment.  Perhaps, while he thinks 
that *this* offender deserves punishment (and the judge therefore pays a ‘preference 
cost’ by letting him evade punishment), the judge values something else, like “narrow 
interpretations of criminal law”, more highly than ‘justice’ in this particular case. 
Therefore, in a thorough analysis of a given decision, we must consider flip side of the 
“benefits” which would be the costs. An important scarce resource affecting all judges in 
some manner is time. Time is a factor the judge weighs when considering the utility 
gained from a particular interpretation with given interpretation against utility cost from 
12 
 
 
time required to sell the interpretation. Time spent on a decision is justified rationally if 
the payoff for a particular outcome is great.  Specifically, Graham wrote:  
Why would judges, who are expected (like the rest of us) to be self-interested 
utility maximizers, some-times act in ways that seem to undermine their 
personal preferences? Why do not judges always interpret legislation in a way 
that gives effect to their own ideological goals? This can be explained as a 
manifestation of self-interest. In many cases, the costs associated with the 
ideological manipulation of text are so great that the judge will be unwilling to 
incur those costs in pursuit of specific policy objectives.24  
…judges weigh the costs and benefits to themselves of those competing 
interpretations. The higher the cost (to the judge) associated with a given 
interpretive choice, the less likely the judge is to choose that outcome; the 
greater the benefit (to the judge) flowing from the relevant choice, the more 
likely the judge is to choose that outcome.25 
These factors provide incentives for making decisions in a particular direction. The 
conscious or unconscious summation of these competing factors results in the chosen 
outcome. 
In summary, the purpose of extending Graham’s theory is to help explain surprising 
judicial common law decisions. The theory explains the decision-making process by a 
considering various factors that act as incentives or disincentives in reaching a particular 
interpretive outcome. The aforementioned differences between common law and 
statute may alter the weight of these factors in the cost/benefit calculation performed 
by the judge. In the second half of this paper a series of cases and decisions will be 
explored that are superficially (doctrinally) confusing decisions. The identification of 
“other” factors that may influence the outcome of these decisions may shine some light 
                                                          
24
Ibid at 51.  
25
Ibid at 52.  
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upon the confusing decisions and serve as an exploratory study, and an early attempt to 
validate the extension of this statutory theory into the common law.  
Chapter 3 
3.1 Overview of Multiple Case Study 
 
Given that the words used in common-law decisions are prone to a wide-array of 
interpretation at best and total deconstruction at worst,26 the constraints they are 
intended to place on judges deciding the outcome of a given case are limited. What 
actually constrains the interpretive possibilities of the principles of law offered in 
common-law decisions is judicial self-interest. The following multiple-case study 
exemplifies how judicial self-interest constrains judicial interpretation of common-law 
precedent by commenting on some surprising and problematic common-law decisions. 
Select decisions within this multiple-case study are surprising because they do not 
appear to be logical extensions of the authoritative case-law precedent, which, in the 
traditional view of the source of law, should determine the outcome of a case decision. 
Instead “other factors”, that are not principles of law, will be noted for their potential to 
affect the judge or justices preferred outcome of a case and for their potential to 
influence a given judicial decision. While each case within this multiple-case study 
technically could be examined with this framework, the focus of this analysis is on the 
decisions that, at the surface level, appear particularly confusing, if not haphazard.  
                                                          
26
 Supra, note 21 ch 2.  
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Both series of cases examined within this multiple-case study purport to define the 
limits of the types of questions that can be put to expert witnesses in cross-examination. 
The first case examined will be R v Howard.27 The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision of 
Howard was unclear and the most reasonable interpretation of it unfortunately varied 
from previously well-established principles of evidence law. The second case examined, 
R v Lyttle,28 wrestles with the surprising language chosen in the Howard decision and 
authoritative the law imposed by it.  
3.2 Howard Facts and Overview 
 
In dissent of the Supreme Court Decision of Howard, Justice L’Heureux Dubé provided a 
tidy summary of the fact scenario and a brief recounting of the prior court’s decisions:  
In the early morning of October 20, 1979, nearly ten years ago, Gregory McCart was 
driving a taxicab [page1350] in the area of the Brunswick Hotel in the City of London. 
Shortly after 2:00 am, he informed his dispatcher that he had found a fare. This was his 
last communication with the dispatcher. Later that morning, McCart’s lifeless body was 
found in a corn field ten miles southwest of the city. McCart had been brutally beaten to 
death with a steel stake. The circumstances of the killing are set out in full in the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal below and need not be repeated here… 
Trudel and the appellant were tried jointly and on November 15, 1980, a jury returned a 
verdict of guilty as charged against each of the co-accused. This conviction was appealed 
and in January of 1983, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had erred in some 
respects and ordered a new trial. Prior to the commencement of the appellant’s second 
trial, Trudel entered a plea of guilty to second degree murder. This plea was accepted by 
the Crown. Counsel for the Crown then read the facts of the case and, while counsel gave 
no explicit account of Trudel’s presence at the scene of the crime, he did say that Trudel’s 
shoes “were identified as having made the footprints near the body in the field”. Counsel 
for Trudel made no objection to the Crown’s statement of the facts nor did he object to 
the Crown’s recommended sentence. Trudel was sentenced to life imprisonment without 
eligibility for parole for a period of twelve years.  
The appellant for his part entered a plea of not guilty. His sole defence was in the nature 
of an alibi, namely, that at all relevant times he was with Trudel and that neither Trudel 
nor he were at [page 1351] the scene of the murder. Giving testimony at his second trial, 
                                                          
27
 [1989] 1 SCR 1337. 
28
 [2004] 1 SCR 193, SCJ No 8.  
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the appellant acknowledged being at the Brunswick Hotel with Trudel until closing time, 
though he denied getting a cab there. The appellant testified that he and Trudel walked 
and eventually hitched a ride to Lambeth in the middle of the night. There, they 
wandered around for some two hours before calling a cab which picked them up at 
approximately 5:00 am. Together with Trudel, the appellant said he then proceeded to a 
bootleggers home in London where both of them drank beer with another person until 
7:00 am. During cross-examination, the appellant stated that he did not know what 
happened to McCart.  
In support of his defence, the appellant called two experts on footprints, Dr. Morton and 
Dr. Watt. Dr. Morton was called to give evidence only at the appellant’s second trial. He 
testified that on the basis of the data in the record, he could not come to any conclusions 
as regards the footprints found near McCart’s body. For his part, when testifying at the 
appellant’s first trial, Dr. Watt had said that the same data did not establish any link 
between the footprints and Trudel’s shoes. Before Dr. Watt took the stand at the 
appellant’s second trial, the Crown sought a ruling on a question it proposed to address 
to him in cross-examination. The question was whether Dr. Watt would change his 
opinion in light of the information that, since he initially testified in the accused’s first 
trial, Trudel pleaded guilty to murdering McCart and thereby apparently admitted that 
the footprints were his. The Crown did not seek to confront Dr. Morton’s evidence with 
the same cross-examination.  
The trial judge ruled that he would allow the proposed question. The appellant then 
elected not to call Dr. Watt. On November 30, 1983, a jury returned a verdict of guilty of 
first degree murder against the appellant. On an appeal against this conviction, a 
unanimous Court of Appeal (Cory J.A., as he then was, Zuber and Grange JJ.A.) dismissed 
the appeal: see (1986), 29 C.C.C. (3d) [page1352] 544.
29
  
There are two key aspects of the fact scenario and case history to note.30 Firstly, 
the co-defendant of Mr. Howard changed his plea prior to the onset of the 
second trial. Secondly, the trial judge permitted crown counsel to put questions 
to the expert about whether they incorporated the change of plea into their 
expert opinion.  
3.3 Howard – Second Appeal – Trial 2.  
 
A convenient starting point for the discussion of the first series of cases which involved 
what was ultimately a series of superficially confusing decisions is the second Ontario 
                                                          
29
 Howard, supra, note 25 at paras 24-28.  
30
 As they apply to this analysis and inasmuch as they determine what relevant law should be cited in the 
traditional view to inform the judge in making their decision. 
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Court of Appeal decision31 of Mr. Howard’s case. In this case, Mr. Howard’s counsel 
appealed the second conviction decided by the trial court claiming that the prosecution 
put an improper question to the defence expert witness. This claim was borne out of the 
exchange between counsel and trial judge pertaining to whether crown counsel could 
put to the defence expert questions regarding the basis of their opinion.  In the decision 
of the second Howard appeal, Cory JA broke down the issue of what-type-of-questions-
can-be-put-to-expert-witnesses into two sub-components. Firstly, whether a 
defendant’s plea is admissible as evidence and, secondly, whether a counsel can put 
questions to an expert witness about the foundation of their opinion. With respect to 
the first sub-issue, the admissibility of evidence, Cory JA, stated:  
There can be no doubt that a plea of guilty by a co-accused is not admissible as 
part of the Crown’s case against an accused. An accused can only be affected by 
his own confession and not those of his accomplices.32  
Cory JA cited R v Berry (1957)33 and R v Lessard (1979)34 in support of the above 
noted proposition.  To address the second sub-component of the issue at appeal, 
whether an expert can be asked question about the foundations of their opinion, 
Cory JA noted:  
The ability to cross-examine a witness as to the basis for his opinion and the 
factors which he has taken into account and those which he has omitted can be 
relevant, pertinent and indeed vital to testing that opinion.35 
                                                          
31
 R v Howard, [1986] OJ No 535, 29 CCC (3d) 544.  
32
 R v Lyttle, [2002] OJ No 3308, 61 OR (3d) 97. 
33
 118 CCC 55 at 60 (Ont CA).   
34
 50 CCC (2d) 175 (Que CA).  
35
 R v Howard, [1986] 15 OAC 255, 29 CCC (3d) 544.   
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Cory JA cited the 1971 Ontario Superior Court decision of R v Rosik36 and the 1982 
Supreme Court of Canada decision of R v Abbey37 in support of the second sub-issue 
proposition of law. The cases Cory J cited are clear and authoritative in describing their 
stance on this matter, leaving little interpretive leeway for future readers. Together, 
these four cases are strong supports for what was, really, a settled issue of law; 
questions put to an expert witness about the foundation of their opinion are not only 
allowed but are also an integral part of the search for truth. The expert’s opinion 
provides an important inference that the Court would otherwise be unable to make on 
its own and is invaluable in numerous litigation settings.38 Being able to challenge the 
opinion-evidence of the expert, for example, by questioning the foundation of the 
opinion, is an important aspect of making a full defence. In the 1991 Supreme Court of 
Canada case R v Seaboyer, McLachlin J (as she then was) noted:  
…In short, the denial of the right to call and challenge evidence is tantamount to the 
denial of the right to rely on a defence to which the law says one is entitled. The 
defence which the law gives with one hand, may be taken away with the other. 
Procedural limitations make possible the conviction of persons who the criminal law 
says are innocent.
 39   
Significantly restraining a defence counsel’s cross-examination of an expert witness, by 
disallowing questions challenging the foundation of their opinion, limits their ability to 
make a full defence to which they are entitled.  Simply put, the defence counsel should 
have been able to cross-examine the expert about the foundation of their opinion. 
                                                          
36
  [1971] 2 OR 47, 13 CRNS 129. 
37
  [1982] 2 SCR 24, [1983] 1 WWR 251. 
38
 Schauer and Spellman Is Expert Evidence Really Different Notre Dame L Rev 1 (2014) at 3.  
39
 2 SCR 577, at 608. McLacchlin J relied on R v Wray, [1971] SCR 272, which was available at the time of 
Howard, to ground the Court’s stance on excluding defence evidence.  
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While Cory J’s decision had a strong legal basis, it also accomplished another objective 
that, potentially, may have been of judicial interest; the twice-convicted defendant goes 
to jail and does not “get-out” on what the public may consider a “legal-loophole.”  
Generally speaking, the public likes to see convicted persons meet justice and this 
decision may provide the judge with a reputation boost from this esteem granting 
population or, rather, prevent the loss of reputation from deciding an alternate 
outcome.   
3.4 Howard – Supreme Court Decision. 
 
Following the dismissed appeal by Cory JA, Mr. Howard’s counsel further pursued this 
issue by appealing to the Supreme Court of Canada. McIntyre, Lamer, Le Dain, La Forest 
and L’Heureux-Dubé JJ were present and heard the appeal for the Supreme Court, 
though Le Dain J took no part in the judgment. The issue brought before the court was: 
did the Ontario Court of Appeal err in upholding the trial judge’s ruling that crown 
counsel was entitled to adduce evidence through the defence expert, evidence relating 
the plea of the co-accused? 
The appellant argued that it would be overly prejudicial to allow the question to be put 
to the expert witness. Specifically the appellants stated: 
1. Since a guilty plea does not amount in law to an admission of 
facts read in at such a plea, there were no facts concerning the 
footprints at [page 1346] the scene of the crime being Trudel’s 
for the Crown to put to the defence footprint expert.  
2. Even if Trudel’s position at his guilty plea constitutes an 
admission of the fact that the footprints at the scene of the 
crime were his, such an admission is inadmissible in evidence. 
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Only Trudel could give the necessary first hand evidence that he 
made the footprints in issue, and he was no called by the 
Crown.  
3. In any event, the fact of Trudel’s admission is irrelevant to the 
opinion of an expert, as the proper parameters for the basis of 
such opinions ar governed by the prevailing professional 
standards of the particular expertise.  
4. In the alternative, if the admission is relevant, it is 
inadmissible. The real object of the proposed line of questioning 
was not to assess the reliability of the expert opinion, but rather 
to establish he truth of the matters put to the expert. Since the 
predominant effect of the proposed questions would be to 
introduce inadmissible hearsay which could be potentially 
misused by a jury, the questions should be disallowed. Further, 
the prejudicial effect of the evidence so introduced would far 
outweigh its probative value because the Crown could not 
prove the guilty plea from whence it came.  
5. A limiting instruction would be insufficient in this case as the 
jury would be incapable of accepting the evidence as applicable 
solely to the basis for the expert’s opinion and not applicable to 
its own truth. 40 
 
The respondent, Crown counsel, argued “the intended question was relevant because 
the trier of fact is entitled to know the basis of an opinion advanced by an expert in 
order to assess its probative value.”41 Both the appellant’s and the respondent’s 
arguments are logical and well-reasoned, though stylistically different, interpretations of 
what precedent should apply to this scenario. While the approach taken by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal to address this issue was to break it down into two sub-issues and cite 
authoritative law governing the composite issues, this was not the approach taken by 
the Supreme Court of Canada. In contrast, Justice Lamer did not cite any previous 
                                                          
40
 Howard, supra, note 25, para 13.  
41
 Ibid, para 14.  
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cases,42 let alone authoritative law, as would be expected. Instead, Lamer J provided a 
broad statement of law and ultimately in favour of the appellants.  
Although the decision of Justice Lamer that was in favour of the appellants can’t simply 
be classified as right or wrong, it was problematic. When deciding between the two 
propositions, Lamer J was essentially deciding which type of risk the Court would accept; 
the risk of prejudicing the plaintiff by not putting all possible probative questions to the 
expert or risk of prejudicing the defence by allowing potentially prejudicial questions to 
be put to the expert. While this is a tough theoretical issue, it boils down to a matter of 
preference of where to place the risk. This balance of risk was already well-settled by 
the Canadian Courts to be in favour of erring on the side of allowing questions to be put 
in cross-examination and in this respect Lamer J’s decision was inconsistent and 
therefore problematic. Further, Lamer J included no citations of common law precedent 
that would have convinced future courts of its appropriateness. Instead, the decision 
was written in a more general manner, laying down a broad principle of evidence law. 
This broad statement of evidence law constrained cross-examination more than what 
was needed for the case at bar, and was a dramatic step towards a more restrictive 
cross-examination.  The following broad and sweeping statement of law appears to have 
been offered as a solution to the issue of the case and may serve as the ratio decidendi.  
Lamer CJ stated:   
                                                          
42 Lamer J could have cited R v Turner [1975] QB 834 where the Court noted that the particular 
experts used in the case should remember that the facts upon which they base their opinion 
must be proved by admissible evidence and added that this principle is often overlooked.  
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It is not open to the examiner or cross-examiner to put as a fact, or even a 
hypothetical fact, that which is not and will not become part of the case as 
admissible evidence. On this ground alone, the question should have been 
denied.43 
The most straightforward interpretation of this statement is that it stands for a broad 
proposition that restricts cross-examination to questions based on facts established in 
evidence and was in fact applied this way in R. v. Fiqia (1993)44 and R. v. Fickes (1994).45 
That this statement is the intended interpretation is supported by a later statement 
made by Lamer J that indicated the appeal could be resolved in full by addressing this 
issue.  Specifically, Lamer J noted: “On this ground alone, the question should have been 
denied”46 further solidifying the interpretation that this is the offered ratio decidendi. 
Indeed, in the dissent of Howard Justice L’Heureux Dubé interpreted the principle stated 
by Lamer J as one that stood for the proposition noted above.  
If, as the reasons given by my colleague Lamer J. suggest, the cross-examination 
was to be limited to the facts which will “become part of the case as admissible 
evidence”, then it would become all but impossible for the accused as well as 
the Crown to cross-examine expert witnesses as to the basis of their opinion. I 
do not believe that such an inflexible approach is warranted. The greater 
latitude allowed to an expert in examination-in-chief involves in my view a 
correlative latitude in cross-examination as to the basis of the expert’s opinion. 
47 
In this statement, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé noted the “reasons” of Lamer J. The word 
“reasons” likely means the “reasons for decision” which is otherwise known as the 
“ratio decidendi”. This indicates Justice L’Heureux-Dubé interpreted Justice Lamer’s 
                                                          
43
 Howard, supra, para 17.  
44
 145 AR 241 (CA), at paras 44-50. 
45
 132 NSR (2d) 314 (CA), at paras 9-10.  
46
 Howard, supra, para 17.  
47
 Ibid, para 43.  
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judgment as standing for the above noted proposition, further reinforcing the idea that 
the noted statement was intended to stand as the decidendi.48  
Also included in the Howard decision was a statement about the role of experts in court. 
Chief Justice Lamer also noted the only scenario where the question put by the Crown 
to the expert witness could be properly put:  
Experts assist the trier of fact in reaching a conclusion by applying a particular 
scientific skill not shared by the judge or the jury to a set of facts and then by 
expressing an opinion as to what conclusions may be drawn as a result. 
Therefore, an expert cannot take into account facts that are not subject to his 
professional expert assessment, as they are irrelevant to his expert assessment; 
a fortiori, as injecting bias into the application of his expertise, he should not be 
told of and asked to take into account such a fact that is corroborative of one of 
the alternatives he is asked to scientifically determine. If the Crown experts had 
been told by the police when they were retained that Trudel had in fact 
confessed and that he acknowledged facts that had established that it was his 
footprint, we would be left in doubt as to whether their conclusion is a genuine 
scientific conclusion. This is so because their expertise does not extend to 
Trudel’s credibility, and what he admits to is totally irrelevant to what they were 
asked to do to help the Court, that is apply their scientific knowledge to the 
relevant “scientific facts”, i.e., the moulds, etc.49  
In this excerpt there are no case law citations. The inclusion of the paragraph, as noted 
by Lamer J, is intended to explain a situation where the question could be properly put 
which is a separate issue than the one at bar and is therefore not the reason why Lamer 
J made the decision. Generally, from a reader’s perspective it appears as a useful 
anecdote. Under the traditional view of the law, this type of comment would be 
                                                          
48
 In the face of a scathing dissent, one would expect a lengthier, more-reasoned decision by Justice 
Lamer. This was not the case in Howard.  
49
 Howard, supra note 26 at 19.  
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considered “obiter dictum” which, traditionally, is not authoritative law.  Therefore, to 
the typical reader, this would not likely be identified as the reasons for the decision.50  
If the originally identified statement that stood for the requirement of a factual basis for 
questions put to expert witnesses is the ratio51 and it is not an extension or application 
of precedent law or thoroughly described legal reasoning, then how did Lamer J arrive 
at the decision? Perhaps, Lamer J disagreed with prior case law, or wished to 
consolidate previous well-regarded case decisions of lower courts into a more 
authoritative Supreme Court decision. Whatever the motivation may be, Lamer J’s 
ultimately decision influenced evidence law much more than was needed to settle the 
issue at bar.  
In summary, the outcome of the Howard decision was a matter of preference for how to 
balance the abstract concepts of probative and prejudicial questions. Although previous 
common law decisions had decided to err on the side of allowing “probative” questions, 
this decision, by contrast, drastically reverses that trend making the outcome ill-chosen 
from a doctrinal perspective of the law.  
Lamer J’s decision drastically transformed the law governing cross-examination.  Under 
the “broad, sweeping statement” Lamer J made, one simply could not put questions to 
experts in cross-examination without first laying an evidentiary basis for asking that 
question. This had never been the law before Howard, and greatly restricted the 
                                                          
50
 Alternatively, Howard’s decision has also been interpreted by Ontario Courts as to the admissibility of 
evidence, as it was seen in R v Norman (1993), 87 CCC (3d) 153 (ON CA).  
51
 Inasmuch as one can identify a ratio.  
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otherwise broad right of cross-examination. Under traditional views of cross-
examination, counsel could ask whatever questions were arguably relevant to the case, 
provided that they were helpful in testing the evidence of the expert. Under the Howard 
view, one could only ask a question if there was some other evidence that laid the basis 
for asking the question. This was an obvious departure from prior decisions – a fact 
made obvious by the fact that Lamer J refrained from citing any authority for his limited 
view of the scope of cross-examination.   
3.5 Lyttle  
 
During the time between the Howard decision and the initial trial of Lyttle, the 
composition of the Supreme Court of Canada had changed.52 Firstly, Cory J, of Howard’s 
appellate decision, was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada on February 1, 1989. 
Cory J’s decision of Howard was overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada, something 
he may not agree with and would like to see reversed. Therefore, Cory J’s fellow justices 
may derive benefit, in the form of gratitude from Cory J, by distinguishing the Howard 
Supreme Court decision that had overturned Cory J’s appellate level decision.  Secondly, 
Lamer CJ, who had overturned Cory J’s decision of Howard, had retired from the 
Supreme Court of Canada which may have potentially lessened the reputational conflict 
of reversing or distinguishing a decision made by him. 
                                                          
52
 Howard’s Supreme Court of Canada appeal was heard between May 19, 1988 and May 18, 1989. 
25 
 
 
Ten years after the Supreme Court’s decision of Howard, a crime was committed that 
prompted the court to revisit the so-called Howard Principle. The facts of the crime 
committed in Lyttle were summarized by Major and Fish JJ as follows:  
On February 19, 1999, Stephen Barnaby was viciously beaten by five men with baseball 
bats, four of them said to have been masked. He was found outside an apartment 
building, collapsed, shivering, with broken bones and with other severe injuries to his 
head ad legs. He had no wallet, no house keys and no identification.  
Barnaby told a uniformed officer, with whom he spoke briefly soon after the attack, that 
he had been beaten over a gold chain.  
Detective Sean Lawson, initially assigned to the case, stated in his “Occurrence Report” 
that the attack was believed to be over a drug debt and the victim was being less than 
truthful. His suspicion in this regard was based on a conversation with Barnaby at the 
hospital, on the ferocity of the beating, and the fact that Barnaby had a drug-related 
conviction, and on other elements of Detective Lawson’s own preliminary investigation. 
On the following morning referring to the Barnaby attack in his “Daily Major” report 
summarizing all serious crimes that had occurred during his shift, Detective-Sergeant Ian 
Ganson wrote: “believed to be [over] a drug debt […] further inquiries”. Ganson, it 
should be noted, never spoke directly with Barnaby. He merely noted, in the usual way, 
on information he had received from subordinate investigation and uniformed officers.  
Lawson’s “Occurrence Report” and Ganson’s “Daily Major” report were disclosed to the 
defence [page199] in a timely manner, as required by law. See R. v. Stinchcombe, [1999] 
3 SCR 326.  
Detective Michael Korb and his partner, Detective Martin Ottaway, took over the 
investigation the day after the attack and obtained a statement from Barnaby at the 
hospital. Korb and Ottaway were aware of the “drug debt gone bad” theory mentioned 
by Lawson and Ganson, but both testified that it did not influence their investigation. 
Unlike Lawson and Ganson, Korb and Ottaway believed Barnaby’s version of the assault 
and the reasons for it.  
Barnaby, at a photographic line-up, identified the appellant as the unmasked attacker.  
 
There are two key points to glean from this fact scenario. First, the report made by the 
arresting officers detailing a potential drug deal gone bad theory was not entered into 
evidence. Second, the trial judge would not allow questions to be put to other experts 
about the drug deal gone bad theory because there was no factual basis and, three, the 
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rationale for the prohibiting the question was that the Howard principle required a 
factual predicate. 
In a voir-dire, prior to Mr. Lyttle’s trial before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, the 
trial judge and the defence counsel had several verbal exchanges with respect to the 
types of questions that could be put to the expert witnesses.53 Over the course of these 
exchanges between counsel and judge, the trial judge made it clear that questions put 
to expert witnesses required substantive evidence. The trial judge plainly stated:  
…but the law is quite clear that if you are making an allegation of that nature 
and of that substance, that you are required then to commit to leading some 
evidence in that regard… 
But I can only tell you the law is that if you are going to make those allegations 
by cross-examining, in the course of cross-examination of the Crown witnesses, 
you had better follow up with substantive evidence… 
I am just saying that there will be a strict adherence to the rules of evidence, 
which require that if you ask a question of the nature we have discussed, that, 
at some point, you are required to produce some foundation or substantive 
basis for asking that question…  
If you fail to follow-up, and under the R. v. Howard case you are obligated 
to…”54 
 
The trial judge claimed to be merely enforcing the law. However, the use of the 
above the noted deferential phraseology, suggests the trial judge could have 
ulterior motives. For example, the trial judge could have been using the Howard 
decision strategically. By using Howard to limit a particular line of questioning by 
the counsel or to satisfy some other preference the trial judge is able to deflect 
                                                          
53
 R v Lyttle, [2004] 1 SCR 193, SCJ No 8.  
54
 Ibid, at para 25.  
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issues of trial fairness due to the obligation to follow stare decisis. While many 
different ulterior motives are possible, the judge did in fact use Howard as the 
reason to deny the question being put to the expert. Ultimately, the line of 
questioning was not put to the new police officers who did not file the drug deal 
gone bad report, counsel did not put the question to the original authors, and 
Mr. Lyttle was convicted.  
3.6 Lyttle Appeal 
 
Mr. Lyttle appealed the trial decision on the grounds that the evidentiary 
directive of Lamer J in Howard should be confined to questions put to expert 
witnesses and that its application to this case fundamentally altered the 
presentation of the defence. It is important to note, for this appeal to make 
sense, that the police officers were not going to be examined as expert 
witnesses. Therefore, confining the Howard ruling to experts would make its 
controversial principle of law irrelevant to the cross-examination of the 
witnesses in Lyttle. If this appeal were to be upheld, then the defence counsel’s 
proposed defence would be allowed without having to give up the rights to the 
final questioning of that expert which is a crucial part of the examination.  
The proposition to limit Howard to expert witnesses is smart and strategic. This 
argument gives Carthy JA an “out” of the doctrine of stare decisis by constraining 
Howard.  Moreover, it allows Carthy JA to navigate the complexities of 
distinguishing a prior decision without suffering a “reputational hit” because it 
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isn’t a tortured extension of logic to limit Howard in this way. Again, the Howard 
decision is ill-conceived, but this is a clever way to reduce the severity and scope 
of its impact. However, Carthy JA did not take the “out”, instead, Carthy JA 
decided that Howard was misunderstood and that it could not stand for the 
proposition that the trial judge and others had interpreted it. Carthy JA stated: 
Lamer J. could not have been intending to lay down a broad rule encompassing 
all forms of cross-examination and to be overruling well-established authorities 
of this court and others without referring to them. The implications of such a 
strict rule would pervade and restrict all traditional cross-examination 
containing any element of speculation.55 
The above paragraph could be interpreted as a veiled-jab at Lamer J because it is 
quite clear that this was what Lamer J had intended for Howard to stand for. 
Carthy JA ultimately held that the trial judge had erred in requiring the defence 
counsel to provide substantive evidence for questions put to expert witnesses 
but that the mistake did not constitute a substantial wrong or miscarriage of 
justice as described in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.  
3.7 Lyttle Supreme Court Decision 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision of Lyttle,56 written by Major and Fish JJ, was lengthy and 
calculated. The Court distinguished the law cited by the trial judge, laid out the actual, 
probably revised, intentions from Howard, re-stated their intentions for how this issue 
should be dealt with from here on, and diverted the onus of the blame from the 
Supreme Court to the trial judge.   
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These strategic actions indicate that the Court read Lamer J’s decision in Howard and 
determined it was ill-conceived and ought to be changed. The judges then, as self-
interested utility maximizers, retroactively came up with a different basis for Justice 
Lamer’s decision that made it more consistent with prior decisions and re-articulated it 
in a way that was far narrower than Lamer J probably intended.  These actions were 
clearly in the best-interests of the Lyttle judges because the law was restored to a more 
sensible place which likely satisfies their desire to do “good” judging, and achieves 
another likely goal of “reputation building.” To accomplish these goals, the court 
diverted the blameworthiness of the ill-conceived Howard principle from Lamer J to the 
courts that had interpreted it. The Supreme Court noted on many occasions that the 
blame of Howard lay with the lower courts who had, apparently, misinterpreted it. 
Evidence of the Court preserving the reputation of the Supreme Court by diverting 
blameworthiness can be seen throughout the decision of Lyttle, where Major and Fish 
JJA noted;  
“We agree as well (with Court of Appeal) that the judge’s error resulted from his 
understandable misapplication of this Court’s decision in R. v. Howard, [1989] 1 SCR 
1337.57  
…Central to the trial judge’s ruling in this case was his understandable but mistaken 
view of Howard…58  
…In our respectful opinion, the ratio of Howard has been misunderstood and 
misapplied. Howard dealt essentially with the admissibility of evidence. Unfortunately, 
the reasons of Lamer J. have been applied beyond their context and the record in this 
case leaves no doubt that a misapprehension of Howard weighed heavily on the trial of 
the appellant…59  
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…By requiring an evidentiary foundation on the basis of Howard, the trial judge erred in 
law.”60  
 
The Court accomplished the goal of “making the law make sense” by distinguishing 
Browne v. Dunn61 which was used by the trial judge of Lyttle as support for the 
proposition that an evidentiary foundation is required for questions put in cross-
examination. Specifically, the Court wrote: “The rule in Browne v. Dunn requires counsel 
to give notice to those witness whom [page213] the cross-examiner intends later to 
impeach” and “… the foregoing rule in Browne v. Dunne remains a sound principle of 
general application, though irrelevant to the issue before the trial judge in this case.”62 
This reinforces the Court’s message that the trial judge was mistaken and relieves the 
Court of the duty to abide by stare decisis since Browne no longer applied.  
A second tactic used by the Court in Lyttle included relocating the ratio decidendi of 
Howard. The Court dismissed the notion that the ratio decidendi of Howard was the 
statement made regarding an evidentiary requirement for questions put in cross-
examination and instead identified a separate statement as the ratio decidendi.  The 
Court noted:  
The ratio of Howard, at p. 1348, is that counsel should not inject bias into the 
application of the witness’s expertise by being told of, and asked to take into 
account, a fact that is corroborative of one of the alternatives he is asked to 
“scientifically determine.63  
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This was not the intended ratio decidendi and the Supreme Court knew it. The above 
noted excerpt is best-suited as obiter dictum. As noted earlier, all signs pointed to the 
“evidentiary requirement” statement as the statement most likely intended to be the 
ratio decidendi. However, the Court likely chose to relocate the ratio decidendi, instead 
of perhaps trying to rework or justify it, because the “evidentiary requirement” ratio 
decidendi was unsalvageable. By simply relocating the ratio decidendi the Court satisfies 
the expectation of having a reason for judgment along with the de-basing of the trial 
judge’s supporting citations the path was cleared for the Court to write a new 
restorative and authoritative position on the issue.  
In summary, Lyttle, from an objective perspective, had the effect of restoring the law to 
a “pre-Howard” state with respect to the cross-examination of expert witnesses.  This 
decision, to restore the law to a “pre-Howard state”, was deemed worthwhile to the 
incumbent Supreme Court members following the removal and addition of Lamer J and 
Cory J’s respective interests, but only if the decision could be framed in such a way that 
protected the reputation of the Supreme Court. Thus, the Lyttle decision was rife with 
strategic choices made by the Supreme Court members to deflect criticism away from 
the Supreme Court toward lower Courts.   
3.8 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the first chapter of this paper briefly reviewed a few key concepts of the 
traditional view of law.  Upon close examination, some of these concepts, such as the 
identification of stare decisis and the source of law, are less stable than they initially 
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appear to be. Investigating these concepts exposes the traditionalist perspective of law 
to some uncomfortable questions, for example, what actually determines the outcome 
of a judicial decision? Fortunately, Legal Realism and in particular Graham’s theory, 
which has thus far been applied to legislation, can help answer some of uncomfortable 
questions. Graham’s theory posits that judicial self-interest serves as the constraint to 
the infinite deconstruction that is possible with the language our law written in. The 
influence of judicial self-interest is especially noticeable in common law cases where the 
outcome of the case is surprising. Together, the two series of cases examined in the 
second half of the paper exemplify how judicial self-interest shapes common law 
interpretation. In the first case, Howard, Lamer J over-stated the law in broad and 
sweeping terms without reliance on the context of other decisions making the final 
decision problematic. In the second case, Lyttle, the Supreme Court revisited the 
problematic decision of Howard and restored the law back to its pre-Howard state but 
did so in a self-interested and strategic way. Judicial self-interest was pervasive 
throughout each of these decisions but was most apparent in the Supreme Court 
decision of Lyttle where the Court shifted the blame of the poorly conceived Howard 
decision from the Supreme Court to lower courts in an attempt to preserve the 
reputation of the Supreme Court.  
The Supreme Court has suggested throughout the Howard and Lyttle decisions that their 
interpretations are driven by stare decisis and not, more simply, a result of the Court 
giving effect to their own preferences.  The reasoning for this, of course, is that the 
Supreme Court does not want to take blame for their own decisions, but prefers to cast 
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the blame for unpopular decisions on the prior law, or other factors that are ostensibly 
beyond their control. I find this behaviour unsettling, but understandable. Over the last 
year, my idealistic view of the Courts has vanished and has been replaced by, what I 
think, is a more nuanced and realistic view. Clearly, common law adjudication involves 
more than just the application of rules. Clearly, there are numerous extra-legal factors 
that do affect the outcome of common law decisions.  This altered view of what affects 
judicial outcomes has not diminished my respect for the Courts. Instead, I have gained 
more respect for the Court. I am now aware of the multitude of factors that do affect a 
judicial outcome, what factors should affect a judicial outcome, and what is reasonable 
to expect from judges deciding a case. Further, this more nuanced understanding of 
common law adjudication has, to me, reinforced the importance of the duties of the 
expert witness. By acting in a bipartisan manner and staying within our professional 
scope we can improve the validity of the opinions that judges take into consideration 
when making their decision, which would reduce the potential discounting of an 
expert’s opinion due to their potential bias and lead to improved common law 
adjudication. 
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